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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BRENDA F. ELLINGSWORTH,

Case No. 970456-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fourth amendment provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides
Sec. 14.
[Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance
of warrant•]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides
(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported

by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109

(1994) provided:

§ 35-1-109.
Workers' compensation insurance fraud -Elements -- Penalties -- Notice.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-201(3).
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-103(1).
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-103(2).
(d)
"Person"
has the same
meaning
as in
Subsection 76-1-601(8).
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in
Subsection 76-2-103(3).
(2) Any person who has intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly, devised any scheme or artifice to obtain
workers' compensation insurance coverage, disability
compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional
services, fees for professional services, or anything of
value under this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly communicates or
causes a communication with another in furtherance of the
scheme or artifice, is guilty of workers' compensation
insurance fraud, which is punishable in the manner
prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the
offense of workers' compensation insurance fraud under
the same conditions as those set forth in Section
76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value
of all property, money, or other things obtained or
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described
in Subsection (1) , except as provided in Subsection
76-10-1801(1) (e) .
(5) Reliance on the part of any person is not a
necessary element of the offense described in Subsection
(1) .
2

(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any
offense described in Subsection
(1) to permanently
deprive any person of property, money, or anything of
value is not a necessary element of this offense.
(7) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers'
compensation insurance coverage includes any scheme or
artifice to make or cause to be made any false written or
oral statement or business reorganization, incorporation,
or change in ownership intended to obtain insurance
coverage as mandated by this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, at rates that do not reflect
the risk, industry, employer, or class codes actually
covered by the policy.
(8) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability
compensation includes a scheme or artifice to collect or
make a claim for temporary disability compensation as
provided in Section 35-1-65 while working for gain.
(9) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in
connection with
this
chapter
or
Chapter
2,
Utah
Occupational
Disease
Act,
prints,
reproduces,
or
furnishes a form to any person upon which that person
applies for insurance coverage, reports payroll, makes a
claim by reason of accident, injury, death, disease, or
other claimed loss, or otherwise reports or gives notice
to the insurer or self-insured employer, shall cause to
be printed or displayed in comparative prominence with
other content the statement:
"Any person who knowingly
presents false or fraudulent underwriting information,
files or causes to be filed a false or fraudulent claim
for disability compensation or medical benefits, or
submits a false or fraudulent report or billing for
health care fees or other professional services is guilty
of a crime and may be subject to fines and confinement in
state prison." This statement shall be preceded by the
words:
"For your protection, Utah law requires the
following to appear on this form: or other explanatory
words of similar meaning.
(10) Each insurer or self-insured employer who
issues a check, warrant, or other financial instrument in
payment of compensation issued under this chapter or
Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to
be printed or displayed in comparative prominence above
the area for endorsement the statement:
"Workers'
compensation insurance fraud is a crime punishable by
Utah law."
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer,
insurer, or governmental entity that reports a suspected
fraudulent act relating to a workers' compensation
insurance policy or claim is not subject to any civil
liability for libel, slander, or any other relevant cause
of action.

3

(12) In any action involving workers' compensation,
this section supersedes Title 31A, Chapter 31, Insurance
Fraud Act.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

refusing

to

suppress medical records and derivative evidence obtained pursuant
to a written consent expressly limiting the use of those records to
"the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers compensation
benefits."
Standard of review.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991);
Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a) (1990).
However, in reviewing the
court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of
error standard. Steward, 806 P.2d at 215.
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654
regard

to consent

(Utah App. 1992) .

to search, the trial court

"In

is granted

only

limited discretion in its application of the legal standard of
consent to the facts."

State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand

Eight Hundred Dollars, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997).
Preserved
(motion), 213:20-50

below

by

motion

to

suppress.

R.

113-4

(transcript of evidence, argument, and bench

ruling).

2.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

allowing

the

prosecution to ask the defendant to comment on the credibility of
State witnesses?
4

Standard of Review.
questions

and

determination

argument,
of

In assessing the prosecutor's

this

whether

court

the

will

prosecutor

make

an

original

brought

improper

information to the jury's attention, and whether such information
probably influenced the jurors.

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486

(Utah 1984) .
The
215:568.

improper

questioning

occurred

at R.

215:564

and

This issue is preserved by defense counsel's objection at

R. 215:568-569; see also R. 213:154 (prior objection, stating "a
witness cannot give an opinion as to the truthfulness or not
truthfulness of a certain statement.").1

3.

Whether the trial committed plain error in allowing

the prosecutor to misrepresent the evidence on multiple occasions?
Standard of review.
In general, to establish the existence of plain
error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged
error that was not properly objected to, the appellant
must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence
in the verdict is undermined.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-9 (Utah 1993).
Not preserved below; addressed here for plain error.

x

Even if the objection made is held not to preserve the issue
with regard to the first improper question, such questioning still
constitutes plain error. State v. Palmer, 860 P. 2d 339, 342 (Utah
App.) (finding it was plain error to allow prosecutor to ask
defendant to comment on credibility of other witnesses) , cert.
denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant
information

dated

Brenda
July

F.

Ellingsworth

25, 1995

with

two

was

counts

charged

by

of Workers'

Compensation Fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109 (Supp.
1994), a 2nd degree felony and class B misdemeanor, for actions
occurring between October 12, 1994 and January 25, 1995.
(information), 7-10

(probable cause affidavit).

motion,

B

the

class

misdemeanor

count

was

R. 2-6

On the State's
dismissed.

Ms.

Ellingsworth was bound over on an amended count of third degree
felony

Workers'

information

Compensation

fraud.

R.

54-5, 75-79

(amended

[3rd degree felony and class B misdemeanor]), 89-92

(second amended information [single 3rd degree felony count]), 100102 (memorandum of law explaining reduction).
Ms. Ellingsworth filed a pretrial motion to suppress
medical reports obtained pursuant to a consent form and derivative
testimony based on those reports, which was denied.
("Motion to

Suppress

Evidence

Illegally

Obtained11);

R. 113-4
213:20-50

(transcript of evidence and argument, bench denial).
Ms. Ellingsworth was convicted at trial.

R. 213-215 (3

volumes of transcripts), 193 (verdict), 196-7 (Judgment, Sentence
(Commitment)).

Ms. Ellingsworth's

sentence was stayed pending

satisfactory completion of probation, R. 196-7, and tfiis appeal
ensued.

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the motion to suppress, Ms. Paola Valente was called
as a witness.

She testified that she has worked four years as an

adjuster at the Worker's Compensation Fund at 392 East 6400 South
in Murray, Utah.

R. 213:21.

Ms. Valente was the adjuster assigned

to Ms. Ellingsworth's October 12, 1994 claim for benefits.
213:22.

R.

On January 11, 1995, Ms. Valente met with Ms. Ellingsworth

to get an authorization to obtain medical records.

R. 213:22-3.

A copy of this authorization, introduced at trial as Exhibit S18-A,
is attached as addendum A.
Ms. Valente "explained to her that we needed to gather
her prior medical records, gave her as much time as she needed,
indicated to her that I needed her to list any and all doctors,
hospitals, clinics, or physicians that she has seen in the last ten
years."

R. 213:24.

"I explained to her that we needed to go ahead

and collect her prior medicals as part of the investigation [i]nto
her claim and that it was part of the investigation and she was
required to cooperate."

R. 213:24-5.

Ms. Ellingsworth signed the release in Ms. Valente's
presence.

R. 213:26. The release provides, "This information will

be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers
compensation benefits."
Valente did not

R. 213:31; see also addendum A.

indicate to Ms. Ellingsworth

that

information

received would be used for criminal investigation of her.
213:32.

Ms.

R.

Pursuant to the consent form, medical records were sought

from all local hospitals.

R. 213:28-9.
7

The trial court denied the motion to suppress on the
basis that the Workers' Compensation Fund is not a state agency.
R. 213:50.

Medical records and derivative evidence that should

have been suppressed were admitted throughout the trial.
During

trial,

the

trial

court

twice

allowed

the

prosecutor to ask Ms. Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of
State witnesses:
Q.
Okay.
Well she testified -- this is my
recollection, and the Jury will give this the weight that
they deem it deserves.
She said that this had never
happened before. Is it your testimony
that she lied
or
misled
the
court?
A.
I don't believe she used those specific words.
She said, "By pulling on a blind cord, " to the best of my
knowledge. That's all I believe she said.
R. 564 (emphasis added).
Q.
Did you hear him
[Dr. Seeman]
testify
repeatedly that he knew nothing about that until this
case was convened?
A.
Yes.
Q.
He isn't
lying?
A.
I don't believe -MS. AH CHING:
Your Honor, objection.
She
can't
comment on the credibility
of another
witness.
MR. GARDNER: But she can comment about what's going
on here. Her testimony is one way someone else is -pardon me. She is saying she lied under oath, is what
she is saying.
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Don't answer that., Miss Ellingsworth.
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think she can say that
she's saying something different, but she can't say,
"Yes, he's lying." I mean, it may be inadvertent on Dr.
Seeman's part.
I think it is inappropriate
for
one
witness
to comment on the credibility
of
another.
THE COURT: I think that's
what the whole trial
is
about.
She can answer.
MR. GARDNER:
Do you need me to repeat that
question?
A.
No, I understood.
No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was lying. But
towards the end, Dr. Seeman was having health problems
8

and he had had strokes and stuff and he wasn't keeping
track of things in the office like he should have been.
So he could have forgotten, or, you know, I am not saying
he was lying.
R. 215:568-9 (emphasis added).
On several occasions, the prosecutor committed misconduct
by introducing unsupported innuendo and mischaracterizing prior
evidence.

In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated:

And she was treated by a medical doctor there. And she
claimed [sic:complained]
of back pain to both the
police
officer
-- and you are going to hear Steve Anjewierden
from the Sheriff's Office testify. He was the officer
on
the case.
He made a report.
He'll testify
that she told
him she had been beaten repeatedly and injured
in the
face and jaw and the upper back.
She told the ambulance
driver, Cal Kunz -- he was with Gold Cross Ambulance
Service, the same thing.
R. 213:125-6 (emphasis added) . In fact, only Cal Kunz was told of
back pain.

See R. 213:189-204 (entire testimony of Anjewierden),

especially at 201-2 (Ms. Ellingsworth did not tell the officer she
was thrown against a wall, officer doesn't recall being told of
back injury, nothing in report indicating back injury).
In

cross-examining

Ms. Ellingsworth,

the

prosecutor

asked:
Q.
Okay. You also testified
that you told
Paola
Valente,
when you talked to her by phone on October 17th,
about the domestic
violence
assault
that happened
three
days earlier;
is that your testimony?
A.
I don't recall. I don't remember saying those
specific words.
Q.
Do you remember telling the Jury that you told
Paola Valente all the information she asked you for?
A.
Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come our and
say, "Has your -- does your husband beat you?" That's
not something -- you know, "Had you been assaulted?", you
know, she didn't ask me anything like that, no.
Q.
Okay. But when you talked to her on the phone
on October the 17th, you didn't tell her about the fact
that three days earlier you had been assaulted; did you?
9

A.
I felt that it was irrelevant because it wasn't
the same area that I hurt at work.
Q.
Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I heard you
testify
that you told Paola Valente about this
assault.
Did I misunderstand you or did your testimony change?
A.
I may have misunderstood you. I don't know.
R. 215:570-2

(emphasis added).

In fact, her prior testimony had

been that she provided Ms. Valente with everything she asked for,
R. 215:549-50, and that she did not mention to Ms. Valente or Mr.
Mann that she had been assaulted because it was to a different area
than was injured at work, R. 215:559-60.
Later, examination included:
Q.
could?
A.
time.
Q.
hospital;
A.
Q.
hospitalized
A.
Q.
A.
talked to
Q.
A.
Q.
hospitalized
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
testimony
A.

You were

telling him as truthfully

as you

Yes. But I was also heavily medicated at that
But you knew you had just come out of the
didn't you?
Yes, I did.
Because he testified
he asked you if you'd been
recently,
and you said,
"No."
He knew.
Did you remember that at all?
He knew that I had been in a hospital. I had
Paula Valente from the hospital.
But Brett Mann was the one talking to you then?
I assumed he knew.
Do you remember him asking you if you had been
recently?
No, I don't.
Do you remember telling
him, no, you
hadn't?
No.
Any reason to believe this transcript and his
was inaccurate?
I don't remember any of it.

R. 215:583-4 (emphasis added).
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
And on cross examination suddenly it is "Well, I just
can't remember. I can't remember anything that happened
to me because I had just gotten out of the hospital. And
I asked, "Well, didn't he ask you if you had been in the
hospital recently?" And you heard Brett
Mann
testify
10

that he asked that specific
question,
"Have you been in
the hospital
recently?"
And the Defendant
said, "No, "
twice.
She said,
no, she had not been
hospitalized
recently.
Well,
today she said,
"I got out of
the
hospital
just one or two days before,
and I had been in
there for a month. "
Ladies and Gentlemen, if you are in the
hospital for a month to have some major work done on your
stomach and you just get out of the hospital one or two
days earlier and you are meeting with someone that says,
"Have you been in the hospital?11, I suggest that each one
of you would say, "Well, yes, I have. I just got out.
I have been in for a month." But not the Defendant. She
denied repeatedly that she had ever been in the hospital.
And I suggest that that's part of the pattern that the
Defendant was trying to use to keep Workers' Compensation
in the dark and keep the money coming and keep the
medical benefits coming and keep the drugs coming.
R. 215:612-13 (emphasis added).
In fact, Mr. Mann testified he asked her, "Have you been
seen by a hospital other
215:495

(emphasis

than

added).

is

your

recent

recent

visit

"And you haven't
The only

industrial injury to now?
hospital

your

stay?"

time

recently?"
been

you have

R.

since

been

in

the
the

R. 215:496 (emphasis added).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

trial

court

erred

pretrial motion to suppress.

in denying Ms. Ellingsworth's

The trial court denied the motion on

the basis that the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah is not a
state actor for purposes of the fourth amendment.

To the contrary,

the Workers' Compensation Fund is created by statute, has directors
appointed by the Governor, and enjoys governmental immunity.

As a

quasi-public corporations, the Workers' Compensation Fund and its
employees are governmental actors for purposes of fourth amendment
analysis.
11

The consent form signed by Ms. Ellingsworth contained the
express limitation, "This information will be used for the sole
purpose of evaluating my claim for workers compensation benefits."
In contravention of this limitation, the State used the medical
records it obtained pursuant to this release for the purpose of
prosecuting Ms. Ellingsworth.

This exceeded the scope of the

limited consent granted, and violated the fourth amendment.
Alternatively, the State has failed to establish that the
consent was voluntary.
Ellingsworth

At the time she signed the consent, Ms.

suffered under the misperception that the records

would only be used to determine her eligibility to receive workers'
compensation benefits.
inclusion

of

She was told she must cooperate.

the limiting

language

in the

consent, absent

The
an

intention to respect that language, constitutes deceit and trickery
in the

inducement.

Under the totality

of the circumstances,

consent here cannot be said to be voluntary.

The

suppression

in

asking

motion denial should be reversed.
The

prosecutor

committed

misconduct

Ms.

Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of other witnesses, and
the trial court erred in allowing him to do so.

State v. Palmer.

This case hinged on Ms. Ellingsworth's credibility and whether the
jury would accept her explanations for her apparent omissions. The
prosecutor's questioning unfairly impugned her credibility to her
prejudice.

Her conviction should be reversed.
The

unsupported

prosecutor

committed

misconduct

in

introducing

innuendo and mischaracterizing prior evidence.
12

In

closing, the prosecutor argued that the jury could convict based on
purported evidence that does not exist.
prejudiced.

Individually

and

Ms. Ellingsworth was

cumulatively,

deprived Ms. Ellingsworth of a fair trial.

the

errors

here

This court should

reverse.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
SUPPRESS
MEDICAL
RECORDS
AND
DERIVATIVE
EVIDENCE
OBTAINED
PURSUANT
TO
MS.
ELLINGSWORTH'S LIMITED CONSENT.
A.

"The

WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND EMPLOYEES ARE
STATE ACTORS FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT.

fourth

amendment

guarantee

against

unreasonable

searches and seizures protects only against governmental actions
and does not extend to the independent acts of private citizens."
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220

(Utah 1988)

(citing United

States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80
L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476, 41 S.Ct.
574, 576, 65 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1921)).

Accord State v. Newbold, 581

P. 2d 991, 992 (Utah 1972) ("The protection of the Fourth Amendment
is a restraint only upon the activities of sovereign authority and
is not applicable to the searches and seizures by any persons other
than government officers and agents.") (plurality opinion).
The fourth amendment applies to all State actors, not
just law enforcement officers.
The strictures of the Fourth Amendment, applied
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, have been
applied to the conduct of governmental officials in
13

various civil activities.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 334-335, 105 S. Ct. 733, 738-739, 83 L.Ed.2d 720
(1985) . Thus, we have held in the past that the Fourth
Amendment governs the conduct of school officials, see
ibid., building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d
930 (1967), and Occupational Safety and Health Act
inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
312-313, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820-1821, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978).
As we observed in T.L.O., "[b]ecause the individual's
interest in privacy and personal security 'suffers
whether the government's motivation is to investigate
violations of criminal laws or breaches of other
statutory or regulatory standards,' . . . it would be
'anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.'
11
469 U.S., at 335, 105 S.Ct., at 739 (quoting Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 436 U.S., at 312-313, 98 S.Ct.,
at 1820 and Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S.,
at 530, 87 S.Ct., at 1731).
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-5, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496, 94
L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).
On the motion to suppress, the trial court held:
The motion's denied.
I'm finding that the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah is not a state agency
and that Miss Ellingsworth knowingly and voluntarily
signed a complete release with the understanding that a
full investigation would be done in order to validate or
invalidate her claim.
You'll do findings and an order, Mr. Gardner,
although they certainly don't need to be done until trial
is over.
R. 213:50.

In ruling on a motion to suppress statements of the

defendant, the trial court shed further light on its prior ruling:
THE COURT: Okay. I will be pleased to read
any case that you find that's pertinent to the issue, but
-- and subject to reversing myself; but I'm going to go
ahead and deny the motion; same basis as the last one, I
don't think this is a state agency.
I think this is
essentially
a private insurance company and what happened
is no different
than if it had happened with Blue
Cross/Blue Shield
of Utah.
And, in fact, Miss
Ellingsworth's actions were in her legitimate attempt to
qualify for insurance benefits. She provided information
14

that was requested. I don't see how this could possibly
be in the nature of a law enforcement interview. That's
the reason for the ruling.
R. 213:72-3 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the court's finding, Workers' Compensation
Fund employees are State agents, working for a State agency, and
are thus subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment.
Workers'

Compensation

Fund

of Utah

is

statutorily

Chapter 3 of Title 35, Utah Code Annotated.2

created

The
by

"There is created a

nonprofit, quasi-public corporation to be known as the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah."

Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-2(1) (a) (1994) .3

The Board of Directors is appointed by the Governor, with the
Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1994).4

advice and consent of the Senate.

Directors are removable for cause by the Governor.
§ 35-3-5(10)

(1994) .5

governmental

immunity

employees of the fund.7

Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-8
to

good

faith

actions

Utah Code Ann.
(1994)6

of

extends

officers

and

Utah Code Ann. 35-3-18 (1994)8 exempts the

2

Now Chapter 33 of Title 31A.
Code sections relating to
workforce services were renumbered in both 1996 and 1997.
See
Tables of Corresponding Sections following Title 35A, Utah Code
Ann. (1997) . Throughout this brief, appellant will refer to those
sections in effect from October 1994 through January 1995, the time
of the offense alleged here, and set forth the current codification
in the margin.
3
4

Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-102 (Supp. 1997).

Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106 (Supp. 1997).

5

Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106(10) (Supp. 1997).

6

Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-109 (Supp. 1997).

7

The Utah Supreme Court has noted:
(continued...)
15

Workers' Compensation Fund from certain specific statutes that
apply generally to all governmental agencies

(e.g., GRAMA, Utah

Administrative Services Act, Administrative Procedures Act).
The Workers' Compensation Fund is thus a creature of
statute, with direct oversight by the Governor and a Board of
Directors appointed by that Governor.

Governmental immunity has

been extended to good faith actions of its officers and employees,
a

protection

wholly

unavailable

to

private

persons

in

the

performance of their non-governmental employment duties. Likewise,
the Workers' Compensation Fund has been exempted from some portions
of otherwise applicable administrative statutory schemes.
Quasi-public

corporations

and

their

employees

governmental actors for purposes of fourth amendment analysis.

are
In

Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174

(1st Cir.

1997) , the First

Telephone

Company,

as

a

government actor

Circuit

held that

quasi-public

the

Puerto Rico

corporation,

"is,

therefore,

a

[cites omitted] subject to the suasion of the

Fourth Amendment."

110 F.3d

at 178.

The court proceeded

7

to

(...continued)
'The immunity from liability of quasi-public
corporations is generally placed upon the ground of their
involuntary and public character.
They are usually
treated as public or state agencies, and their duties are
ordinarily wholly governmental.
They exercise the
greater part of their functions as agencies of the state
merely, and are created for purposes of public policy,
and hence the general rule that they are not responsible
for the neglect of duties enjoined on them, unless the
action is given by statute.'
Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950)
(quoting McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 2775 (2nd E d . ) .
8

Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-104 (Supp. 1997).
16

address the fourth amendment invasion of privacy claims made by the
appellants on the merits.

The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah

stands on equal footing, and it and its employees are government
actors for purposes of the fourth amendment.
In reaching its erroneous ruling, the trial court seemed
to rely on the distinction that the function of the Workers'
Compensation Fund is akin to that of a private insurance company:
I'm going to go ahead and deny the motion; same basis as
the last one, I don't think this is a state agency. I
think this is essentially a private insurance company and
what happened is no different than if it had happened
with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Utah.
R. 213:72-3. The trial court's observation concerning the function
performed by the Workers' Compensation Fund

is irrelevant

for

purposes of fourth amendment analysis. The inquiry begins and ends
with whether governmental

action is implicated.

Granted, the

Workers' Compensation Fund essentially operates as an insurance
company.

But the mere fact that its function could be performed by

a private actor, e.g. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, does not serve to
change its status from that of a governmental actor to a private
actor.
Numerous functions in everyday life are performed by both
government and private actors.

Private parcel delivery services

perform essentially the same task as the Postal Service.
this

similarity

applicable

in

function,

to the United

that

the

States Postal

fourth
Service

Despite

amendment

has long been

recognized:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are
as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except
17

is

as to their outward form and weight, as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of
the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may
be.
Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and
examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be
seized, as is required when papers are subjected to
search in one's own household. No law of Congress can
place in the hands of officials connected with the postal
service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters
and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations
adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in
subordination to the great principle embodied in the
fourth amendment of the Constitution.
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877).
No similar constitutional proscription is applicable to
private parcel carriers.

Thus, in United States v. Jacobsen, 466

U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), the court found no
violation of the fourth amendment where a package was opened and
examined

by

employees

of

Federal

Express,

carrier, and found to contain cocaine.

a

private

freight

"[T]he fact that agents of

the private carrier independently opened the package and made an
examination that might have been impermissible for a government
agent

cannot

unreasonable."

render

otherwise

reasonable

official

conduct

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114-5, 104 S.Ct. at 1657.

Indeed, the distinction drawn by the trial court, if
taken to its logical conclusion, would entirely eviscerate the
fourth amendment.

Trial courts would only have to observe that

police officers, in effectuating challenged searches and seizures,
were merely performing the function of private security guards.

18

The

trial

court

erred

in denying Ms.

Ellingsworth's

motion to suppress on the basis that employees of

statutorily

created Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah are not state actors
subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment.

B.

OF MS. ELLINGSWORTH1 S MEDICAL
TO PROSECUTE HER FOR FRAUD
THE SCOPE OF THE LIMITED CONSENT
SIGNED.

THE USE
RECORDS
EXCEEDED
FORM SHE

To be proper under the fourth amendment, the State has
the burden of showing that an exception to the warrant requirement
is applicable to a warrantless search.

Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

Consent
State

v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Durand, 569
P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1977); State v. Kelsev, 532 P.2d 1001, 1004
(Utah 1975) . "Even when a constitutionally valid consent is given,
the scope of the ensuing search must be limited to the scope of the
consent, and police activity that exceeds the scope of the consent
violates the Fourth Amendment."

State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1218

(Utah 1993) ; accord Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 100
S.Ct.

2395,

measuring

2401/

the

65 L.Ed.2d

scope

of

a

410

(1980).

suspect's

consent

"The

standard

under

the

for

Fourth

Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness--^hat wyald the
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between
the officer and the suspect?"

State v. Castner, 825 P. 2d 699, 705

(Utah App. 1992) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111

19

S.Ct.

1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d

297

(1991)); accord State v.

Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 552 n.6 (Utah App. 1994).
The

written

consent

Ms.

Ellingsworth

signed

here

contained the express limitation, "This information will be used
for

the

sole

purpose

compensation benefits."

of

evaluating

my

claim

for

workers

This limiting language constrained the

State to using the medical records it obtained only in determining
whether the Workers' Compensation Fund would pay benefits.

"The

terms of the consent limit police authority to search in the same
fashion as the terms of a search warrant."
1201, 1218 (Utah 1993) .

State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d

The State exceeded the express limits of

the consent it obtained, and used the information it obtained to
prosecute Ms. Ellingsworth for fraud.
In

similar

circumstances,

courts

have

held

the

limitations contained in a consent to be binding on the State, and
have suppressed the results of uses of evidence exceeding those
allowed in the consent.

In In re J.W.K. , 1988 WL 61133 (Minn.App.

1998) ,9 a juvenile was one of four persons suspected of involvement
in vandalizing a golf course and stealing golf carts.

Police

requested blood samples of all four suspects to compare to evidence
found at the scene.
authorizing

the

J.W.K. and his mother signed a consent form

sheriff's

department

to

M/

[t]ak[e]

blood

from

[J.W.K.] to compare against evidence from where one of the golf
carts was stored for a short time. 7 "

9

J.W.K. at *1.

After the

In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (11) (B) , this
decision obtained from Westlaw is reproduced in full in addendum B.
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blood was drawn, another suspect confessed and J.W.K.'s sample was
never compared to the golf course evidence.
However, J.W.K.
burglary.

Id.

was also a suspect

in a residential

His blood sample was compared to evidence obtained in

that crime and found to match.
results, J.W.K. confessed.

When confronted with the test

The district court ordered the test

results and confession suppressed.

Id.

The appellate court affirmed the suppression:
We conclude that the scope of J.W.K.'s consent
is limited by the terms of its authorization. [ ] Here,
suppression was proper because the use of J.W.K.'s blood
sample to compare to evidence from the burglary exceeded
the scope of the consent.
The plain language of the
consent form prepared by law enforcement undermines the
State's contrary argument. [ ] Police ignored their own
explicit assurance to J.W.K. that his blood would be used
only for evidence related to the golf course crime, and
instead used it for evidence of an unrelated crime.
Obtaining consent to search for evidence of one crime and
using that consent to search for evidence of another
crime exceeds the scope of the consent. [ ]
In re J.W.K., 1998 WL 61133 at *2 (cites omitted).
In Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 960, 91 S. Ct. 353, 27 L.Ed.2d 269
Graves was arrested for public drunkenness.

(1970), Mr.

Shortly after his

arrest, police became aware that he fit the description of the
assailant in a recent rape.
sample.
informed

Police asked Mr. Graves for a blood

He initially refused, "but finally consented when he was
that the sample would be used only to determine

alcoholic content of his blood."

424 F.2d at 525.

the

The blood was

tested for blood type, and was found to be of the same type as the
rapist.

The court affirmed the district court's finding that
21

testing Mr. Graves7 blood for blood type without a warrant violated
his fourth amendment rights.

" [I]n this case we do not void the

consent as to the purpose for which it was given.

In the presence

of misrepresentation in its acquisition, we simply limit the state
to the purposes represented."

Graves. 424 F.2d at 526 n.2.

Cf.

United States v. Andrews, 746 F.2d 247, 250 (5th Cir. 1984),cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 2032, 85 L.Ed.2d 314

(1985),10

where police deception in getting a felon to turn over guns was
found not to violate the constitution, where "there is no evidence
indicating that Andrews was assured his production of the guns
would only be used to investigate the robberies."

Accord United

States v. Davis, 749 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1985) (felon showed
officers his firearms to show he had no machinegun; "There is no
evidence that they at any time assured Davis that his production of
the guns would be used only to ascertain whether any of them were
machine guns."), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 464, 93
L.Ed.2d 409 (1986).
The

facts here

show that

the consent

signed by Ms.

Ellingsworth contained the express limitation, "This information
will be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for
workers compensation benefits." Contrary to this representation by
the Workers' Compensation Fund, the records were in fact used to
prosecute Ms. Ellingsworth for Workers' Compensation fraud.

10

This

Overruled on other grounds in United States v. Hurtado, 905
F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1990) (voluntariness of consent need only be
established by preponderance, rather than clear and convincing
evidence as stated in Andrews).
22

exceeded the scope of the consent.

The medical records and the

fruits of those records must be suppressed as they were obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment.

C.

ALTERNATIVELY,
THE
STATE
FAILED
TO
ESTABLISH
THAT
MS.
ELLINGSWORTH
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO HAVE THE MEDICAL
RECORDS RELEASED TO THE STATE FOR USE IN
PROSECUTING HER FOR FRAUD.

For the State to show consent, "the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily

given, and not

express or implied."

the result

of duress or coercion,

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248,

93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
question

of

fact

circumstances.

to

be

determined

from

Voluntariness is a

the

totality

Id. at 248-9, 93 S.Ct. at 2059.

of

the

In State v.

Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court set forth
a non-exhaustive list of factors that could be considered:
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion
include: 1) the absence of a claim of authority to search
by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force
by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4)
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer.
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106.
Under the totality of the circumstances here, the State
cannot establish a voluntary consent to have the State use Ms.
Ellingsworth's medical records for any and all purposes, including
criminal prosecution of her. Significantly, here there was a claim
of authority.

Ms. Valente testified:

23

A.
I explained
to her that we needed to go ahead
and collect her prior medicals as part of the
investigation onto [sic] her claim and that it was
part

of the investigation
R. 213:24-5

and she was required

(emphasis added).

to

cooperate.

A claim of authority by itself is

sufficient to defeat a finding of voluntariness:
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of
proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given." This burden cannot be discharged by
showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority. []
...
When a law enforcement officer claims authority
to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect
that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The
situation is instinct with coercion--albeit colorably
lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be
consent.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-9, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792,
20

L.Ed.2d

797

Ellingsworth that

(1968).

Ms.

Valente's

explanation

to

Ms.

"she was required to cooperate" vitiates any

possibility of the existence of voluntary consent.
In addition, the consent form signed by Ms. Ellingsworth
as part of her required cooperation stated, "This information will
be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers
compensation benefits." Contrary to that representation, the State
used

the

information

to

prosecute

Ms.

Ellingsworth.

This

misrepresentation by itself is sufficient to negate the existence
of voluntary consent:
It is a well established rule that a consent
search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the
consent was induced by the deceit, trickery or
misrepresentation of the Internal Revenue agent. United
States v. Rothstein, 530 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1972) cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 843, 93 S. Ct. 43, 34 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972);
24

United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971)
cert, denied, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 944, 30 L.Ed.2d 788
(1972); United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S. Ct. 242, 27
L.Ed.2d 247 (1970); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91
S.Ct. 62, 27 L.Ed.2d 62 (1970).
United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977); accord
United States v. Wuaaneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983).
The Workers' Compensation Fund employees

involved

in

investigating Ms. Ellingsworth, like IRS employees, usually are
involved in determining civil obligations but may also get involved
in criminal investigations.

Like the IRS, they may not obtain

valid consent through deceit, trickery or misrepresentation. See
also McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 403 (Colo. 1981) ("Where, as
here, entry into the home is gained by a preconceived deception as
to purpose, consent in the constitutional sense is lacking.").
Collectively,

the

totality

of

the

circumstances

surrounding the consent form establish that no voluntary consent to
use Ms. Ellingsworth's medical records for any purpose other than
evaluating her claim was granted.

As one court has stated:

Intimidation and deceit are not the norms of
voluntarism. In order for the response to be free, the
stimulus must be devoid of mendacity. We do not hesitate
to undo fraudulently induced contracts.
Are the
disabilitie here less maleficent?
Alexander v. United States, 390 F.2d 101, 110 (5th Cir. 1968) . Ms.
Ellingsworth's medical records and the fruits of those records must
be suppressed as they were obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment.
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D.

Ms.

MS. ELLINGSWORTH WAS PREJUDICED BY THE
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED.

Ellingsworth's

medical

records

were

prominently in the prosecutor's opening statement.
131.

discussed

R. 213:127-9,

Paola Valente testified concerning execution of the medical

records release, and testified that she received several hundred
medical records in response to the request

she sent out.

R.

214:334-339.

to

an

She

forwarded

the

records

Dr.

Chung,

independent medical examiner who examined Ms. Ellingsworth at the
request of Workers' Compensation Fund. R. 214:340-1, -346, -347-8,
352.

Exhibit 10-A, a timeline chart of preexisting illnesses, was

compiled from the medical records.

R. 214:350-1.

Exhibit 10-B

extended the timeline, with the two charts covering the period from
January 27, 1987 through February 10, 1995.

R. 214:353.

Though

neither chart was received into evidence, R. 214:360-1, they were
discussed in the presence of the jury, R. 214:350-353, leaving the
definite

impression that the State had a mountain of evidence

concerning Ms. Ellingsworth's preexisting back injuries.
Dorothy

Prewitt, Director

of Medical

Records

at St.

Mark's Hospital, testified concerning records from March 27, 1976
through

the

time

of

the

alleged

offense

indicating

that Ms.

Ellingsworth had visited the hospital eighty times, including 74
emergency room visits.

R. 214:402-408.

Dr. Bruce Argyle testified about his treatment of Ms.
Ellingsworth on January 30, 1994 at Cottonwood Hospital for an
upper back injury sustained while moving furniture.
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R. 214:411-7.

He testified concerning a second visit on February 11, 1994, again
complaining of upper back pain.
admitted as Exhibit 15.

R. 214:415-417.

His reports were

R. 214:413, 416, 417 (report identified),

442 (admitted).
Dr. Robert Gannon testified about his treatment of Ms.
Ellingsworth at Holy Cross Hospital (currently Salt Lake Regional
Hospital) on March 16, 1994 for upper back pain secondary to moving
furniture.

R. 214:421-5.

His report was admitted as Exhibit 16.

R. 214:423-5 (identified), 442 (admitted).
Dr. Rhonda Smith testified about her treatment of Ms.
Ellingsworth at Holy Cross on May 18, 1994 for upper back, neck,
and shoulder pain.
Exhibit 17.

R. 214:429-33.

Her report was admitted as

R. 214:430-1 (identified), 442 (admitted).

Ms. Valente testified that the medical records contained
a report of an emergency room visit secondary to a domestic assault
on October 14, 1994, and that this was how she first learned this
information.

R.

214:351.

She

testified

that

based

on

the

information learned from the medical reports concerning preexisting
and subsequent injuries, she would not have paid benefits to Ms.
Ellingsworth.

R. 214:356-3 60.

Dr. Jeff Chung testified about the Independent Medical
Examination (IME) that he performed on Ms. Ellingsworth on January
11, 1995.

He originally concluded that she had musculoskeletal

injury, and recommended a work hardening program (physical therapy
for eight hours a day, five days a week).

R. 214:446-450.

After

examining the medical records at issue here, including Exhibits 15,
27

16,

and

17, he

filed

an

addendum

to his

report

stating

his

conclusion that he did not believe that her complaints of pain were
the

result

of

Manufacturing.

an

injury

on

October

12,

1994

at

Blynco

R. 214:451-3, 462-3.

The medical records were critical to the State throughout
the presentation of its case. Derivative evidence obtained through
exploitation of the records included the State's discovery of the
October 14 domestic assault,11 the change in Dr. Chung's conclusion
concerning whether the pain Ms. Ellingsworth experienced was the
result of a work related accident, R. 214:451-3, 462-3; and the
discovery

of

Drs.

Argyle,

Gannon,

and

Smith

who

testified

concerning prior upper back injury.12
Absent the above testimony, the State's case was far from
compelling.

All that remained was the evidence concerning Ms.

Ellingsworth's statements to Brett Mann of the investigative unit
of Workers' Compensation Fund.

Mr. Mann was assigned to the case

on February 7, 1995 to investigate allegations of a preexisting
condition that was not revealed.

R. 215:488. Mr. Mann interviewed

Ms. Ellingsworth on February 27, 1995, and was soon joined by Ms.
Valente.

R. 215:490.

Ms. Ellingsworth was asked multiple times

whether she had any previous shoulder or back injury, and responded
^Presented at trial through the testimony of Deputy Steven
Anjewierden, who investigated the domestic assault, R. 213:189-203;
the testimony of Mr. Cal Kunz, an EMT who transported Ms.
Ellingsworth to the hospital, R. 213:204-228; and the testimony of
Dr. Steven Minnaugh, the emergency room physician who examined Ms.
Ellingsworth, R. 213:248-272.
12

Their testimony is contained at R. 214:411-421, 421-7, and
428-36 respectively.
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negatively.

R. 215:492-5, 499-500.

she had no subsequent injuries.

She likewise responded that

R. 215:493-4, 496.

On cross-

examination and redirect, the record reveals that the questioning
proceeded as follows:
Q.
One of the first things I want to ask you about
is any prior injuries you sustained to the industrial
injury of October 12th, 1994. Can you go through your
medical history for us and explain?"
A.
My first industrial accident I had was in 1980.
That was a knee injury. That was not through Workers'
Comp. That was through WASAU[.]
Q.
Do you have any prior history with your
shoulder and back?
A.
No.
R. 215:509-10.
Then she was asked is she had any other injuries since
the industrial accident, and she responded negatively.

R. 215:510.

A.
I had to have my ulcers cut out of my stomach,
so that had nothing to do.
Q.
What about the last couple of years?
A.
No.
Q.
Brenda, would you be surprised to know that we
have medical files from numerous hospitals, numerous
emergency rooms?
A.
And they are Workers' Compensation?
Q.
No. Not under Workers' Compensation.
A.
I have had other injuries, yes.
Q.
Okay, have you had any injuries since October
12th, 1994?
A.
No, I haven't.
By Ms. Valente: Not necessarily industrial, just
any injury at all.
Q.
Any injury.
A.
I get migraines. Sometimes I have to go to the
hospital.
Q.
Okay, but you haven't had an injury?
A.
No.
Q.
You haven't been injured in any way, shape or
form since the industrial accident?
A.
Not to my knowledge.
R.215:511-2, 523-4.
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On Page 4 of the interview, Mr. Mann started discussi
the assault:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

When did you move from that location?
I have lived there for about seven months.
Seven months?
Uh-huh. I think I know what you are referring

to,
Q.
Yeah, I hoped you would.
A.
Yeah, my husband came there and beat me up. Is
that what you are talking about?
Q.
I am asking if you had any injuries since the
industrial accident.
A.
Well, I wasn't quite sure what -Q.
That's why we sat and explained it to you. Not
necessarily Workers' Comp, any type of injury at all.
A.
Okay. Well, he beat me up and stuff. I did go
to the hospital for that.
R. 215:512-4.
Later, the interview continues:
Q.
Okay. Which is a lot more than what you are
telling us. A lot, lot more. And some of them have been
back pain, shoulder pain which is prior to the injury
date with the Fund.
You don't recall any of those
visits?
A.
No, I never turned anything in.
Q.
I am not saying that you turned it in. I am
saying that you went to the ER and you complained of back
pain and shoulder pain.
A. Yeah, I had previous back pain and stuff, but
nothing like I was having after I got hurt. I explained
that to those people.
R. 215:514-5.
Q.
So you don't remember all the doctors and all
the emergencies visits?
A.
What I am saying is I am under medication. I
don't know the stuff.
Q.
I understand that.
A
I am just having a hard time thinking right
now; whereas, if I had paperwork and stuff at home, it
would be easier. I don't have a problem with giving that
to you.
R. 215:516-7.
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Prior to this interview, Ms. Ellingsworth had just been
released from the hospital after her ulcer surgery.
In

a

subsequent

telephone

interview

on

March

R. 215:518.

3,

1995,

Ms.

Ellingsworth indicated that she believed her prior back problems
were lower back problems rather than upper back problems.

R.

215:501-3.
On the whole, reasonable minds could come to different
conclusions from these statements.
released

from

the

hospital

and

Ms. Ellingsworth,

still

on

recently

medication,

appears

confused and has trouble understanding that the State is seeking
information about ANY other injury, rather than just Workers'
Compensation claims. The record reveals that Ms. Ellingsworth only
completed the seventh grade, having quit school to have a son at
age 13.

R. 215:535.

She testified that she did not understand

that the State wanted information about ANY injury.

R. 215:552,

554, 556-7.

The statements made to Mr. Mann do not lead to an

overwhelming

conclusion that Ms. Ellingsworth

intentionally

knowingly devised a scheme or artifice to defraud.
§ 35-1-109 (1994).
the medical

Utah Code Ann.

Quite possibly, she was just confused.

records and derivative evidence, a more

result is probable.

Without

favorable

This Court should reverse.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
PROSECUTOR TO ASK MS. ELLINGSWORTH TO COMMENT
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF OTHER WITNESSES.
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or

During

trial,

the

trial

court

twice

allowed

the

prosecutor to ask Ms. Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of
State witnesses:
Q.
Okay.
Well she testified -- this is my
recollection, and the Jury will give this the weight that
they deem it deserves.
She said that this had never
happened before. Is it your testimony
that she lied
or
misled
the
court?
A.
I don't believe she used those specific words.
She said, "By pulling on a blind cord, " to the best of my
knowledge. That's all I believe she said.
R. 564 (emphasis added).
Q.
Did you hear him
[Dr. Seeman]
testify
repeatedly that he knew nothing about that until this
case was convened?
A.
Yes.
Q.
He isn't
lying?
A.
I don't believe -MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, objection.
She
can't
comment on the credibility
of another
witness.
MR. GARDNER: But she can comment about what's going
on here. Her testimony is one way someone else is -pardon me. She is saying she lied under oath, is what
she is saying.
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Don't answer that, Miss Ellingsworth.
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think she can say that
she's saying something different, but she can't say,
"Yes, he's lying." I mean, it may be inadvertent on Dr.
Seeman's part.
J think
it is inappropriate
for one
witness
to comment on the credibility
of
another.
THE COURT: I think that's
what the whole trial
is
about.
She can answer.
MR. GARDNER:
Do you need me to repeat that
question?
A.
No, I understood.
No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was lying. But
towards the end, Dr. Seeman was having health problems
and he had had strokes and stuff and he wasn't keeping
track of things in the office like he should have been.
So he could have forgotten, or, you know, I am not saying
he was lying.
R. 215:568-9 (emphasis added).
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It is misconduct for the prosecutor to ask a witness to
comment on the credibility of a witness.

In State v. Palmer, 860

P.2d 339 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993), this
court reversed under a plain error standard of review.
the prosecutor

questioned

the defendant

In Palmer,

concerning whether

an

alleged child abuse victim and his mother were "mistaken or lying."
860 P.2d at 343-4.
781,

787

This court, quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d

(Utah 1992), held that asking a witness about another

witnesses's veracity was obvious error.
937 P. 2d 527, 528 n.l

Accord State v. Begishe,

(Utah App. 1997) .

Here, defense counsel

properly objected to the prosecutor's line of questioning and was
overruled.

This was error.
Arguably, defense counsel's objection may not serve to

preserve the issue with respect to the first instance where the
prosecutor asked Ms. Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of
another witness.
plain error.

However, this question certainly

constitutes

Palmer was decided July 22, 1993, almost 4 years

prior to trial in the instant case in May of 1997.

Palmer held

that even as of that date it is plain error to ask a witness to
comment on the credibility of another witness.
Under the unique facts of this case, a finding of plain
error is especially appropriate.

In addressing a pretrial motion,

defense counsel started to argue State v. Rimmasch, 775 F.2d 388
(Utah 1989):
MS. AH CHING: - - i f you're going to make a -- what
the Court -- what Rimmasch says, Judge, is two things:
Number one -- and I hope the Court is familiar with
Rimmasch.
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THE COURT: I'm familiar with Rimmasch.
MS. AH CHING:
That was a case where expert
witnesses provided testimony that, number one -THE COURT: Why do you ask me if I'm familiar with
Rimmasch and them go on to tell me what the case says.
I said, "Yes."
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I need to establish for
the record -- I mean, if the Court of Appeals is going to
say that I was ineffective in representing Miss
Ellingsworth if I don't provide a basis for what I'm
asking the Court to do.
THE COURT: I told you that I was familiar with the
case. Go ahead and make your argument.
R. 213:13.
The

first

issue

addressed

in Rimmasch

is whether

a

witness may testify concerning the truthfulness of a witness on a
prior occasion:
Utah Rule of Evidence 608(a) provides in pertinent part:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked
or supported by evidence in the form of
opinion or reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only
to
character
for
truthfulness
or
untruthfulness... .
This rule permits testimony concerning a
witness's
general
character
or
reputation
for
truthfulness
or untruthfulness
but prohibits
any
testimony as to a witness's truthfulness on a particular
occasion.
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989).

In the context

of the trial court's repeated pronouncements of his familiarity
with Rimmasch, it is particularly troubling that he concluded that
"I think that's what the whole trial is about" in response to
defense

counsel's

assertion

that

it

is

inappropriate

witness to comment on the credibility of another.

for

one

A finding of

plain error is warranted.
The errors here were harmful.
the

prosecution

had

to

establish
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To obtain a conviction,
that

Ms.

Ellingsworth

intentionally or knowingly "devised a scheme or artifice to obtain
. medical benefits

. . .

by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions" and
that a communication was made in furtherance of the scheme or
artifice.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109(2) (1994).

The prosecutor's

questioning placed Ms. Ellingsworth in the untenable position of
either having to comment negatively on other witnesses, a prospect
that makes her less likable to the jury, or suffer the risk that
the jury will draw the inference that it is her testimony that is
a prevarication.

Critical to Ms. Ellingsworth's defense was the

preservation of her credibility, and her ability to persuade the
jury that any omissions made were an honest error resulting from
her own confusion and lack of education.

She would be convicted if

the jury rejected her testimony, R. 215:552, 556-7, that she did
not

inform

the Workers'

Compensation

Fund

of preexisting

and

subsequent injuries because she did not believe they were relevant.
In cases where credibility is critical to the jury's
determination of the disputed facts, courts have not hesitated to
reverse.

For example:

Since defendant's determination of guilt was based
substantially on the jury's assessment of the credibility
of the victim versus the credibility of the defendant, we
cannot say that absent Allred's testimony bolstering the
credibility of the victim, there would not have been a
result more favorable to defendant. Our confidence in
the verdict is undermined.
State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1989)
Since this case depended on the jury's assessment of the
victim's credibility versus the defendant's, and there is
not
"other evidence
[to support] the defendant's
conviction," Rammel, 721 P.2d at 501, beyond that which
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is tainted by Deputy Purdy's improper testimony, we
cannot say that absent the error there is not a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result to the
defendant.
State v. Iorcr, 801 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah App. 1990) .
The State's case against Stefaniak hinged entirely on the
credibility of the victim.
The sole issue in dispute
was whether Stefaniak removed his swimming suit, thereby
exposing himself to C.C. There was no physical evidence
introduced, nor was there testimony from the other
children who accompanied the victim and Stefaniak on the
trip to Bear Lake.
The victim's report was first made
several months after the incident, in the midst of
domestic turmoil between the victim's mother and
Stefaniak.
" [T]his case depended on the jury's
assessment of the victim's credibility versus the
defendant's, and there is not 'other evidence [to
support] the defendant's conviction' ... beyond that
which is tainted by ... improper testimony."
[State v.
Iorg, 801 P.2d] at 942 (quoting State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d
498, 501 (Utah 1986)) . Accordingly, "we cannot say that
absent the error there is not a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result to the defendant. "[] Id.
State v. Stefaniak, 900 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah App. 1995) .
The prosecutor's

improper

questioning

impacted Ms. Ellingsworth's credibility.
better result is probable.

here

adversely

Absent these errors, a

This Court should reverse.

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR
IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO MISREPRESENT THE
EVIDENCE.
At trial, the prosecutor repeatedly misrepresented the
evidence.

In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated:

And she was treated by a medical doctor there.

of back pain

And

to both the

she

claimed

[sic:complained]

officer

-- and you are going to hear Steve Anjewierden

from the Sheriff's Office testify. He was the officer
the case.
He made a report.
He'll testify
that she
him she had been beaten repeatedly and injured
in
face and jaw and the upper back.
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police
on
told
the

She told the ambulance

driver, Cal Kunz -- he was with Gold Cross Ambulance
Service, the same thing.
R. 213:125-6 (emphasis added) . In fact, only Cal Kunz was told of
back pain.

See R. 213:189-204 (entire testimony of Anjewierden),

especially at 201-2 (Ms. Ellingsworth did not tell the officer she
was thrown against a wall, officer doesn't recall being told of
back injury, nothing in report indicating back injury).
In

cross-examining

Ms.

Ellingsworth,

the

prosecutor

asked:

Q.
Valente,

Okay.

You also

testified

that

you told

Paola

when you talked to her by phone on October 17th,

about the domestic

violence

assault

that

happened

three

days

earlier;
is that your testimony?
A.
I don't recall. I don't remember saying those
specific words.
Q.
Do you remember telling the Jury that you told
Paola Valente all the information she asked you for?
A.
Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come our and
say, "Has your -- does your husband beat you?" That's
not something -- you know, "Had you been assaulted?", you
know, she didn't ask me anything like that, no.
Q.
Okay. But when you talked to her on the phone
on October the 17th, you didn't tell her about the fact
that three days earlier you had been assaulted; did you?
A.
I felt that it was irrelevant because it wasn't
the same area that I hurt at work.

Q.
testify

Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I heard you
that you told Paola Valente about this
assault.

Did I misunderstand you or did your testimony change?
A.

I may have misunderstood you.

R. 215:570-2 (emphasis added).

I don't know.

In fact, her prior testimony had

been that she provided Ms. Valente with everything she asked for,
R. 215:549-50, and that she did not mention to Ms. Valente or Mr.
Mann that she had been assaulted because it was to a different area
than was injured at work, R. 215:559-60.
Later examination included:
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Q.
could?
A.
time.
Q.
hospital;
A.
Q.
hospitalized
A.
Q.
A.
talked to
Q.
A.
Q.
hospitalized
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
testimony
A.

You were

telling

him as truthfully

as you

Yes. But I was also heavily medicated at that
But you knew you had just come out of the
didn't you?
Yes, I did.
Because he testified
he asked you if you'd been
recently,
and you said,
"No."
He knew.
Did you remember that at all?
He knew that I had been in a hospital. I had
Paula Valente from the hospital.
But Brett Mann was the one talking to you then?
I assumed he knew.
Do you remember him asking you if you had been
recently?
No, I don't.
Do you remember telling
him, no, you
hadn't?
No.
Any reason to believe this transcript and his
was inaccurate?
I don't remember any of it.

R. 215:583-4 (emphasis added).
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
And on cross examination suddenly it is "Well, I just
can't remember. I can't remember anything that happened
to me because I had just gotten out of the hospital. And
I asked, "Well, didn't he ask you if you had been in the
hospital recently?" And you heard Brett
Mann
testify
that he asked that specific
question,
"Have you been in
the hospital
recently?"
And the Defendant
said,
"No,"
twice.
She said,
no, she had not been
hospitalized
recently.
Well,
today she said,
"I got out of
the
hospital
just one or two days before,
and I had been in
there for a month. "
Ladies and Gentlemen, if you are in the
hospital for a month to have some major work done on your
stomach and you just get out of the hospital one or two
days earlier and you are meeting with someone that says,
"Have you been in the hospital?", I suggest that each one
of you would say, "Well, yes, I have. I just got out.
I have been in for a month." But not the Defendant. She
denied repeatedly that she had ever been in the hospital.
And I suggest that that's part of the pattern that the
Defendant was trying to use to keep Workers' Compensation
in the dark and keep the money coming and keep the
medical benefits coming and keep the drugs coming.
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R. 215:612-13 (emphasis added).
In fact, Mr. Mann testified he asked her, "Have you been
seen by a hospital other
215:495

(emphasis

than

added).

is

your

This

recent

recent

"And

you

The only

industrial injury to now?
hospital

your

stay?"

recently?1'

visit

haven't

time

you

been
have

R.

since

been

in

the
the

R. 215:496 (emphasis added).

questioning

and

argument

was

plain

error.

Prosecutors are not at liberty to introduce unsupported innuendo.
"Generally, it is error to ask an accused a question that implies
the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can
prove the existence of the fact.

Otherwise, the only limit on

such a line of questioning would be the prosecutor's imagination."
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-7 (Utah 1992) . Accord State v.
Peterson,

722

(questioning

P.2d

about

768,
prior

769-70

(Utah

convictions

1986)

after

(per

denial

curiam)

by

witness

improper absent extrinsic proof of convictions); State v. Palmer,
860 P.2d 339, 343

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah

1993) .
The prosecutor should not have indicated in his opening
statement

that

Officer

Anjewierden

would

testify

that

Ms.

Ellingsworth told him that her back was injured by her husband in
the domestic assault.
which

the

prosecutor

He testified to the contrary.
doubtless

indicates nothing of the kind.

used

in

trial

His report,

preparation,13

R. 213:201-2.

13

See R. 213:194-196 (prosecutor shows officer his report, and
offers it [unsuccessfully] into evidence).
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This error should be addressed by this Court.

In a

similar context, the Palmer court noted:
The next question is whether the error is obvious. The
trial judge could not know whether later evidence would
support the inculpatory inferences of the prosecutor's
questions.
Thus, we cannot say the error was obvious.
However, this is a circumstance "when an error not
readily apparent to the court" does not raise an
"insurmountable barrier to review." State v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29, 35 n. 8 (Utah 1989).
In this case, the
egregious nature of the prosecutor's question and the
strong inculpatory inferences contained therein lead us
"to dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that
justice can be done."
Id.
Unless we apply this
exception, this type of error would always escape review
under the obviousness requirement.
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App. 1993).
The

prosecutor's

assertion

in

cross-examining

Ms.

Ellingsworth that she had testified that she told Ms. Valente about
the domestic assault is wholly unsupported.

This should have been

obvious to the trial court.

The prosecutor's assertion that Ms.

Ellingsworth

been

denied

having

recently

hospitalized

interview with Mr. Mann is likewise made of whole cloth.
testified that he was asking about hospitalizations
your recent visit recently."

in

her

Mr. Mann

"other than

The prosecutor used this purported

evidence, which was wholly of his own creation, to argue in closing
that this purported evidence established a scheme or artifice to
defraud.

The jury was invited to convict Ms. Ellingsworth on the

basis of non-existent evidence that the prosecutor manufactured in
his own imagination.

possible

Ms. Ellingsworth has been prejudiced.

It is entirely

that

of

acceptance

of

she

was

convicted

the

prosecutor's
40

on

the

concocted

basis

assertion

the

jury's

that

Ms.

Ellingsworth denied the existence of her one month hospitalization
for stomach surgery.

The unsupported innuendo concerning Officer

Anjewierden in opening statement placed before the jury yet another
piece of fabricated evidence that the jury could rely upon in
convicting her.

Absent these errors, a better result is probable.

Reversal is appropriate if the cumulative effect of
several errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) . Here, the improper
questioning of Ms. Ellingsworth by asking her to comment on the
credibility

of

other witnesses

acted

in conjunction with

the

improper evidence manufactured by the prosecutor to deprive Ms.
Ellingsworth

of

a

fair

trial.

By

improperly

impugning

Ms.

Ellingsworth's credibility, and arguing nonexistent evidence as a
basis for conviction, the integrity of the jury verdict has been
compromised.

This court should reverse.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Ellingsworth respectfully
requests that the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress be
reversed, that her conviction be reversed, and that the case be
remanded for further proceedings.
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ADDENDUM A
Medical Records Release (Ex. S18-A)

AUTHORIZATION TO FURNISH MEDICAL OR OTHER INFORMATION
Patient/Claimant:
Claim Number:
Date of Injury:
Employer:
Social Security:
Date of Birth:

BRENDA ELLINGSWORTH
9429549-A7
10/12/1994
BLYNCO MANUFACTURING & DISTRIB
528-02-6811
6/21/1961

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I hereby authorize any physician, surgeon, or other medical professional,
nurse, dentist, hospital, ambulance service, rehabilitation/convalescence/
custodial facility, or other medical provider,,and any group insurance carrier
or other company or individual and all of my employers present and past, to
furnish to the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah all records in their
possession regarding myself including records regarding injuries, medical
history, physical condition, insurance claims, and employment records both
before and after the date of my signature on this form, regardless of the
time of occurrence. This information will be used for the sole purpose of
evaluating my claim for workers compensation benefits,
(
(

)

IF X-RAYS WERE TAKEN, SEND ONLY THE READING OR DIAGNOSIS;
DO NOT SEND THE X-RAY FILMS.
) SEND THE READING OR DIAGNOSIS AND THE X-RAY FILMS.

Unless arrangements have been made for an authorized representative of the
Workers Compensation Fund to pick up the records, said records should be
mailed to:
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
P.O. BOX 57929
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157
Please put the above claim number on the records when you send them.
A complete photocopy of this authorization shall be accepted as if it were
a signed original. By signing this release, I represent that I have read
the information on this page and understand the authorization I now make.

j/stfa&q5
Date of Authorization

P a t i e n t ' s Signatil^e

3T7£ So

77huU*A

^ \MA

Address

.2«fa &b. itak ***>
City, State, Zip

SPECIAL RELEASE: In addition to the above, please release record
pertaining to psychiatric, drug, or alcohol treatment, if any.
Date of Authorization

Patient's Signature
PROVIDER LIST
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ADDENDUM B
Decision In In re J.W.K., 1998 WL 61133 (Minn.App. 1998)
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In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.W.K., Child.
No. CX-97-1696.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Feb. 17, 1998.
Syllabus by the Court
*1 When a juvenile signs a consent form allowing
police to compare the juvenile's blood to evidence
found at a specified crime scene, the district court may
properly suppress evidence obtained without consent
that compares the juvenile's blood to evidence found at
another crime scene.
Kandiyohi County
J5-97-50382

District

Court

File

No.

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, St. Paul,
Boyd Beccue, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Jeffery S.
Thompson, Assistant County Attorney, Willmar, for
appellant State of Minnesota.
Ramona Lackore, Assistant Public Defender, Willmar,
Mark D. Nyvoid, St. Paul, for respondent J.W.K.
Considered and decided by HARTEN, P.J., and
HUSPENI and KLAPHAKE, JJ.
OPINION

suspects to compare to evidence found at the
vandalized crime scene. On October 17, both J.W.K.
and his mother consented to have J.W.K. give a blood
sample and signed a form: "Consent/Permission to
Search." The form authorized the sheriffs department
to "[t]ak[e] blood from [J.W.K.] to compare against
evidence from where one of the golf carts was stored
for a short time." Both J.W.K. and his mother testified
that they consented to a blood test to clear J.W.K. of
any involvement in the golf course crimes. They were
not asked and did not consent to a comparison of the
blood sample to evidence found at the burglary.
J.W.K.'s blood was drawn but was never tested or
compared to evidence found at the golf course because
a different suspect confessed to that crime.
Investigating officers in the golf course crime informed
the burglary investigator that they had a sample of
J.W.K.'s blood that they no longer needed, and they
turned the blood sample over to him. A test comparing
J.K.W.'s blood sample against the evidence found at
the burglary linked J.K.W. to the burglary. On April
14, J.W.K. and his mother were informed of the test
results, J.W.K. was interviewed, and J.W.K. confessed
to the burglary.
At a pretrial hearing, J.W.K. moved to suppress
evidence of the blood tests and his ensuing confession.
The district court ordered the evidence suppressed.
ISSUE
Did the district court err by suppressing the blood test
and confession?

KLAPHAKE, Judge.
ANALYSIS
The district court ordered suppression of J.W.K.'s
blood comparison test and confession, ruling that the
blood test exceeded the scope of J.W.K.'s consent and
the confession was the fruit of the unconstitutional
search. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 27, 1996, a home in New London was
burglarized and vandalized. Police collected blood
they found splattered in the home. The investigating
detective suspected J.W.K., then 15 years old, of the
crime.
On October 12, 1996, someone vandalized a New
London golf course and stole golf carts. Evidence led
investigating officers to include J.W.K. as one of four
suspects. Police requested blood samples from all four
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I of the Minnesota
Constitution proscribe unreasonable searches." State
v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1996). Absent
exigent circumstances, a warrantless search is per se
unreasonable. Id. While a search warrant is normally
required for the taking of blood, a defendant can waive
this Fourth Amendment right by consenting to the
search. State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 340
(Minn. 1977).
*2 The state argues that once J.W.K. submitted a
blood sample, he no longer had a privacy interest in the
identifying information contained in his blood. The
state relies on cases upholding the constitutionality of
blood tests to create DNA data banks. However, the
lessened privacy interest recognized by Rise v.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995) and similar cases
was limited to the privacy interest of convicted felons:
Once a person is convicted of one of the felonies
included as predicate offenses * * * his identity has
become a matter of state interest and he has lost any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying
information derived from the blood sampling.
Id. at 1560. Accord Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336,
1340 (10th Cir.1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,
306-07 (4th Cir.1992). These cases do not diminish
J.W.K/s legitimate expectation of privacy in the
information contained in his blood. See Gilbert, 262
N.W.2d at 340 (Fourth Amendment requires warrant or
consent to obtain suspect's blood sample); accord
Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir.1991)
(warrantless testing of blood for HIV antibodies that
are not evanescent violated Fourth Amendment); State
v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 342 S.E.2d 789, 794
(N.C.I986) (blood type not evanescent and test
without warrant violated Fourth Amendment); State v.
Comeaux, 786 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex.Ct.App.1990)
(state violated defendant's fourth amendment rights
when it searched defendant's blood obtained pursuant
to valid consent but tested for purpose unrelated to
consent), review denied (Tex. Nov. 6, 1991).
We conclude that the scope of J.W.K.'s consent is
limited by the terms of its authorization. See State v.
Schweich, 414 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn.App. 1987);
see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656,
100 S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). Here,
suppression was proper because the use of J.W.K.'s
blood sample to compare to evidence from the
burglary exceeded the scope of consent. The plain
language of the consent form prepared by law
enforcement undermines the state's contrary argument.
Cf. Current Tech. Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enters., Inc.,
530 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 1995) (any ambiguity in
contract construed against drafter). Police ignored
their own explicit assurance to J.W.K. that his blood
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would be used only for evidence related to the golf
course crime, and instead used it for evidence of an
unrelated crime. Obtaining consent to search for
evidence of one crime and using that consent to search
for evidence of another crime exceeds the scope of the
consent. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d at 230.
*3 When police decided to compare J.W.K.'s blood
with evidence found at the residential crime, they
conducted an additional search without J.W.K.'s
consent and without a warrant. This additional search
violated J.W.K.'s Fourth Amendment rights. See id.
(search that exceeds authorized consent is
unreasonable and violations Fourth Amendment); cf.
Walter, 447 U.S. at 654, 100 S.Ct. at 2400 (although
law enforcement lawfully possessed rolls of 8mm film,
viewing film for purpose of obtaining crime evidence
was additional search requiring warrant or consent);
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36
L.Ed.2d 900 (1973) (analysis of contents of fingernails
was search requiring constitutional protection
distinguishing fingerprints and voice samples
constantly exposed to public). The constitutional
violation required suppression of J.W.K.'s blood tests
and his resulting confession. See Schweich, 414
N.W.2d at 230-31 (suppressing evidence obtained
from illegal search and evidence that was fruit of
illegal search).
DECISION
The district court properly suppressed evidence
obtained by comparing J.W.K.'s blood to evidence at
the residential crime scene because that search
exceeded the scope of J.W.K.'s consent.
Affirmed.
END OF DOCUMENT
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